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Research on empathy for pain has provided evidence of an empathic bias toward racial
ingroup members. In this study, we used for the first time the “minimal group paradigm”
in which participants were assigned to artificial groups and required to perform pain judg-
ments of pictures of hands and feet in painful or non-painful situations from self, ingroup,
and outgroup perspectives. Findings showed that the mere categorization of people into
two distinct arbitrary social groups appears to be sufficient to elicit an ingroup bias in
empathy for pain.
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INTRODUCTION
Empathy is thought to play a critical role in social interactions
in motivating prosocial behavior (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1990). This
human ability is a psychological construct regulated by both cog-
nitive and affective components (e.g., Decety and Jackson, 2004;
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). The affective component involves
sharing the emotional experiences of others, while the cognitive
component involves thinking about and understanding the mental
states of others.
Research on the psychological and neural mechanisms of empa-
thy has substantially grown this past decade, focusing more specif-
ically on how we share the pain of others, one of the most basic and
universal human experiences. In this regard, it has been recently
demonstrated that response to other’s pain depends on the social
relationships between the observer and the individuals experienc-
ing the outcome. For example, affective links (e.g., Singer et al.,
2006), perceived similarities (e.g., Perry et al., 2010), and social
memberships (e.g., Xu et al., 2009) are likely to modulate the level
of empathy experienced by the observer toward agent’s pain. More
precisely, number of studies on empathy for pain in intergroup
contexts has provided evidence of an empathic bias toward racial
ingroup members (Xu et al., 2009; Avenanti et al., 2010; see Chiao
and Mathur, 2010, for a review).
In the field of social psychology, it is well-known that peo-
ple are remarkably adept at dividing up the social world into us
versus them, and that this propensity has important affective, cog-
nitive, and behavioral consequences such as prejudice, stereotype,
and discrimination. These various implications are particularly
induced when categorical information such as race, gender, or
age, provide visually salient cues to group membership (Fiske and
Neuberg, 1990). However, studies based on the Minimal Group
Paradigm (MGP; Tajfel et al., 1971) have demonstrated that the
mere categorization of individuals into two social groups on the
basis of arbitrary criteria, such as whether they tend to overes-
timate or underestimate the number of dots on a screen (Diehl,
1990), is sufficient to produce similar consequences as compared
to natural groups. Now, no studies used the MGP, in research on
empathy for pain. Thus, the present study examined whether the
mere categorization of people into distinct arbitrary social groups
is sufficient to elicit an ingroup bias in empathy for pain. To this
end, participants were shown pictures of people in painful or non-
painful situations and were instructed to imagine themselves or
imagine members of two minimal groups (ingroup vs. outgroup)
in the same situations. Participants then had to rate the level of
perceived pain according to the different perspectives (e.g., Jackson
et al., 2006).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-six native French speakers were included (eight males;
mean age= 21.5± 2.2). None had prior or current treatment
for any psychiatric disorder or neurological condition (Godefroy
et al., 2010). The study conformed to the IASP’s guidelines and
was approved by the local ethics committee (CPP Nord Ouest
2, Amiens, France). All participants provided informed written
consent.
PROCEDURE
Upon arrival in the lab, participants provided informed consent
and were asked to fill out the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI;
Davis, 1983; French version: Guttman and Laporte, 2002). The IRI
is a multidimensional measure composed of 28 self-report items
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using a 5-point Likert scale and designed to evaluate different
dimensions of empathy. The subscales of the IRI consist of four
subscales of seven items. The Fantasy (F) subscale assesses the
tendency to imaginatively transpose oneself into fictional situa-
tions (e.g., I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a
novel). The Perspective Taking (PT) subscale assesses the tendency
to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others
(e.g., I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make
a decision). The Empathic Concern (EC) subscale assesses the ten-
dency to experience feelings of sympathy and concern for others
in distress (e.g., I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less
fortunate than me). The Personal Distress (PD) subscale assesses
the tendency to experience distress and discomfort in response
to distress in others (e.g., In emergency situations, I feel apprehen-
sive, and ill-at-ease). In the present study, and as in previous ones
(e.g., Rankin et al., 2006), we chose to focus on two IRI subscales
only, which measure the cognitive (PT subscale) and affective (EC
subscale) components of empathy.
After filling out the IRI, participants were informed that the
session was part of a larger project investigating the relationship
between cognition and emotion. They were comfortably seated
at a viewing distance of 70 cm from a computer monitor and
instructed to perform a cognitive task in order to determine their
cognitive profile. A dot-estimation task was used to divide sub-
jects into two fictive groups: 18 participants were categorized as
underestimators, i.e., those who allegedly had underestimated the
number of dots in a series of stimulus displays, while 18 others
were categorized as overestimators, i.e., those who allegedly had
overestimated the number of dots in a series of stimulus dis-
plays. Finally, the experimenter gave additional information to
the participants about the supposed differences between the two
groups in order to reinforce their feeling of membership (see also
Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2001; Pinter and Greenwald, 2011) and,
more specifically, to avoid potential effects of asymmetry in terms
of status or power (e.g., Sachdev and Bourhis, 1987; e.g., “Previ-
ous research has shown that people who overestimate the number
of dots tend to process perceptual information in a bottom-up
fashion. That is, you tend to examine the finer details of new
stimuli, and then form an overall impression. In contrast, people
who underestimate the number of dots tend to process perceptual
information in a top-down fashion. That is, they tend to form
an overall impression, and then examine the finer details of new
stimuli. However, none of these two modes of processing is better
than the other one.”).
Just after the minimal categorization procedure, participants
performed an emotion task, i.e., a pain judgment task in which
they were shown 36 static visual stimuli, consisting of 18 color
pictures showing hands and feet in painful situations and 18 color
pictures of hands and feet in non-painful situations (Jackson et al.,
2005). Adobe Photoshop® (Adobe Systems, Inc.) was used to resize
the images to approximately 500× 375 pixels (screen resolution:
1024× 768 pixels). The stimuli were presented in three blocks
(themselves, members of the ingroup, and member of the out-
group) of 36 trials each, for a total of 108 trials. At the beginning
of each block, the participants were instructed to imagine them-
selves, a member of the ingroup, or a member of the outgroup
in the displayed situations, and to rate the level of perceived pain
according to the different perspectives. The order of the blocks was
counterbalanced on a between-subjects basis. The trial sequence
started with a fixation cross for 500 ms. Then the stimulus was pre-
sented until participants responded. Immediately after the onset
of the stimulus, subjects were instructed to deliver their ratings
by pressing with the right hand one of nine computer keys (with
scores ranging from 0= no pain to 8= very severe pain). After
responses, an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 1000 ms was added.
Following the pain judgment task, subjects completed a 20-item
adjective rating scale, including 10 positive items and 10 negative
items (Montalan et al., 2011), to measure ingroup bias. The nega-
tive stimuli had a mean valence rating of −3.04± 1.47, while the
positive stimuli had a mean valence rating of 3.85± 0.93. Partic-
ipants rated how descriptive each item was for each target group.
Responses range from 0= does not describe to 8= describes com-
pletely. The negative adjectives of the scale were reverse scored.
Thus, an evaluative score (ES) used to measure ingroup bias was
calculated by subtracting for each participant the outgroup eval-
uation score from the ingroup evaluation score (outgroup bias:
ES< 0, no bias: ES= 0, and ingroup bias: ES> 0).
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
For the pain judgment task, pain ratings and response times were
submitted to two repeated-measure analyses of variance (ANOVA)
with Stimulus (Pain vs. No-pain) and Perspective (Self vs. Ingroup
vs. Outgroup) as within-subject factors. For the ingroup bias
measure, difference of evaluation scores from zero was evaluated
with a one-sample t -test. Finally, Pearson’s correlation coefficients
between the subjects’ performance in the pain judgment task, the
evaluation scores and the IRI scores (PT and EC scores) were also
calculated. For all statistical analyses, the α was fixed at 5%.
RESULTS
PAIN JUDGMENT TASK
Pain ratings
The two-factor ANOVA revealed a significant effect for Stimulus,
due to higher ratings for pain stimuli (M = 5.32± 1.45) than for
no-pain stimuli (M = 0.49± 0.74), F(1, 35)= 634.77, p< 0.001.
However, a significant interaction effect between Stimulus and
Perspective (Figure 1) was also found, F(2, 70)= 3.29, p< 0.05.
Firstly, and according to our hypothesis, the difference in ratings
of the pain and no-pain stimuli was calculated for each of the
three types of perspectives. This difference was significantly higher
for the ingroup perspective (M = 5.11± 1.25) as compared to the
outgroup perspective (M = 4.55± 1.59),F(1,35)= 5.29,p= 0.05.
Secondly, we also compared the three types of perspectives with
each other for the pain and no-pain stimuli respectively. For the
no-pain stimuli, no significant differences were found. In contrast,
pain ratings were significantly higher in the ingroup perspective
(M = 5.54± 1.31) than in the self-perspective (M = 5.16± 1.33)
for the pain stimuli, F(1, 35)= 6.04, p< 0.05, no significant dif-
ferences being observed with the two others comparisons (self vs.
ingroup and ingroup vs. outgroup).
RESPONSE TIMES
The statistical analysis of response times (RTs) revealed a signifi-
cant main effect for Stimulus, due to longer RTs for pain stimuli
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FIGURE 1 | Pain ratings (left) and response times (right) as a function of stimuli (pain vs. no-pain) and perspective (self vs. ingroup vs. outgroup).
*<0.05; **<0.001.
(M = 2370± 847) than for no-pain stimuli (M = 1787± 961),
F(1, 35)= 31.11, p< 0.001. However, the interaction between
Stimulus and Perspective (Figure 1) was significant, F(1,
35)= 5.51, p< 0.01. Planned comparisons disclosed that the
responses for pain stimuli were significantly longer than those for
no-pain stimuli in the self-perspective, F(1, 35)= 53.80, p< 0.001,
and in the ingroup perspective, F(1, 35)= 18.09, p< 0.001.
EVALUATIVE INGROUP BIAS
The mean evaluation score was positive (M = 1.19± 1.61) and
a one-sample t -test revealed that it significantly differs from
zero, t (1, 35)= 4.45, p< 0.001. As shown in Table 1, no corre-
lation coefficients between the subjects’ evaluation scores and the
performance in the pain judgment task reached significance.
EMPATHY MEASURE
The descriptive scores of the IRI and the correlation results are
reported in Table 1. As shown, a significant negative relation
between the EC scores and the ratings of no-pain stimuli in the
ingroup perspective was observed, r =−0.39; p< 0.05. Moreover,
a positive relation between the EC scores and the RTs for the
Pain/No-pain difference in the ingroup perspective reached also
significance, r = 0.41; p< 0.05.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we replicated previous findings showing that
the mere assignment of individuals to arbitrary groups (i.e., the
MGP) elicits evaluative preferences for ingroup relative to out-
group members (Brewer, 1979). More interestingly, we found that
the mere act of categorizing people in two distinct social groups
is also sufficient to elicit an ingroup bias in empathy for pain1.
Indeed, participants rated pain stimuli as more painful when they
had to adopt the perspective of an ingroup’s member as com-
pared to their own perspective, while the outgroup perspective
did not induce different responses to painful pictures as com-
pared to the self-perspective. Moreover, the ratings differences
1 One might argue that by highlighting the distinction between the two groups – or
introducing information relevant to power or status relations (see Method section),
they were not minimal in the accepted sense (Tajfel et al., 1971). Thus, the effects we
found would be a function of interpretations of the content we provided – whereas
additional information was devoid of any positive or negative evaluation– rather
than the mere categorization. It is worth to notice that some authors have used a
similar procedure (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2001; Pinter and Greenwald, 2011), but
none of them pointed this aspect. Moreover, given that our method does not allow us
to clarify this issue, further investigations should be conducted in order to make sure
that the mere act of categorizing people in two distinct social groups is sufficient to
elicit an ingroup bias in empathy for pain, for example by comparing performances
in two paradigms with and without these instructions.
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Table 1 | Cognitive (the PerspectiveTaking subscale) and affective (the Empathic Concern subscale) subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity
Index (IRI; Davis, 1983; French version: Guttman and Laporte, 2002), evaluation scores, and correlation results.
Interpersonal reactivity index Evaluation score
Perspective taking Empathic concern
Mean 18.77 19.94 1.19
SD 4.57 3.86 1.61
Range 6–27 12–28 −2.4–6.5
Ratings RTs Ratings RTs Ratings RTs
PAIN STIMULI
Self-perspective 0.05 −0.02 0.23 0.19 0.12 0.04
Ingroup perspective 0.16 −0.08 0.03 0.17 0.14 −0.29
Outgroup perspective −0.09 −0.16 0.01 0.11 0.03 −0.05
NO-PAIN STIMULI
Self-perspective −0.02 −0.12 0.04 0.06 0.30 0.25
Ingroup perspective −0.08 −0.08 −0.39* −0.19 −0.06 −0.12
Outgroup perspective 0.05 −0.03 −0.29 −0.08 −0.09 0.10
DIFFERENCE PAIN/NO-PAIN
Self-perspective 0.06 0.09 0.23 0.16 0.00 −0.21
Ingroup perspective 0.20 0.01 0.22 0.41* 0.18 −0.17
Outgroup perspective −0.13 −0.09 0.20 0.19 0.09 −0.15
*p<0.05.
between the painful and non-painful pictures were more impor-
tant in the ingroup perspective than in the outgroup perspective.
Taken together, these observations are consistent with a more gen-
eral empathic bias toward ingroup members previously shown in
the field of intergroup relations (e.g., Brown et al., 2006; Tarrant
et al., 2009). For example, some authors found that participants
reported stronger empathy when a student in distress belonged to
an ingroup compared to an outgroup university (Tarrant et al.,
2009). In a similar way, Brown and collaborators (2006) pro-
vided evidence for an empathic ingroup bias, participants showing
exaggerated affective responses to positive and negative pictures
depicting ingroup members.
Contrary to previous studies (e.g., Jackson et al., 2006; Li and
Han, 2009), we did not find that taking self-perspective induced
faster reactions to perceived pain. In contrast, we found partici-
pants to respond more quickly to non-painful than painful stimuli
when taking self or ingroup perspective, but not when taking
outgroup perspective. Such a discrepancy may be due to method-
ological differences. In previous researches, response times were
collected based on two-alternative forced-choice tasks (i.e., sub-
jects had to judge painful vs. non-painful pictures on each trial)
so that the subjects can assign a simple, repeatable, and differen-
tiated motor response to each decision. In contrast, in the present
case, reaction times were measured as participants had to rate
the level of perceived pain according to the different perspectives.
Thus, slower reactions to perceived pain in the self and in group-
perspectives could be due to the more care took in accurately
assigning a number to pain felt, or alternatively, perhaps an addi-
tional stage of processing. Regardless of eventual explanations, it is
worth to notice that the same pattern was found when participants
had to adopt their own perspective or the one of an ingroup’s mem-
ber, suggesting the implication of the same mechanisms in these
two conditions.
It is well documented in social psychological literature that
when two individuals become close, the other is integrated into the
self-concept (e.g., Aron et al., 1991). In this vein, Smith and Henry
(1996) demonstrated that self-other overlap in mental represen-
tations was more important for individuals defined as ingroup
members as compared to outgroup members. Thus, an evalua-
tive ingroup bias would be based on the individuals’ proclivity
to extend their positive self-representations to encompass their
groups (e.g., Cadinu and Rothbart, 1996; Otten and Epstude,
2006). In a similar way, to the extent that similarity between one-
self and another may have an important impact on the level of
empathy experienced toward another (e.g., Batson et al., 1995;
Perry et al., 2010), this overlapping mental representations of the
self and the ingroup may also explain the empathic ingroup bias.
As compared to previous studies showing that failures of empathy
toward outgroup members potentially make them likely targets
for prejudice and discrimination (e.g., Gutsell and Inzlicht, 2010),
we did not find, however, any relationship between the evaluative
and empathic ingroup biases.
Our results also revealed that the cognitive (PT ) subscale of
the (IRI; Davis, 1983; French version: Guttman and Laporte, 2002)
did not predict the participants’performance in the pain judgment
task. This suggests that ingroup bias in empathy for pain would not
be based on the individuals’ abilities to adopt the perspective of the
other. In contrast, the pain judgments in the ingroup perspective
were correlated to the EC subscale of the IRI. This confirms the
critical role of the affective component, i.e., the affect produced in
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response to someone else’s emotional state, in empathic ingroup
bias for pain, as suggested by antecedent neural investigations (e.g.,
Xu et al., 2009).
In conclusion, the present study provided new evidence that an
observer feels more empathy for someone in pain when that per-
son is in the same social group. But more importantly, we showed
for the first time that the mere categorization of individuals on the
basis of minimal criteria is sufficient to elicit such an ingroup bias
in empathy for pain. Further investigations should be conducted
to explore the neural basis of this minimal ingroup bias in line
with previous neural researches on empathy for pain in intergroup
contexts (Xu et al., 2009; Avenanti et al., 2010; Gutsell and Inzlicht,
2010; for a review, see Chiao and Mathur, 2010).
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